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INTRODUCTION How QUICKLY IS NEW PRIVATE INFORMATION about the underlying value of a speculative commodity incorporated into market prices? How valuable is private information to an insider? How does noise trading affect the volatility of prices?
What determines the liquidity of a speculative market? The purpose of this paper is to show how answers to questions like these can be obtained as derived results by modelling rigorously the trading strategy of an insider in a dynamic model of efficient price formation. In the particular model we investigate, one risky asset is exchanged for a riskless asset among three kinds of traders: a single insider who has unique access to a private observation of the ex post liquidation value of the risky asset; uninformed noise traders who trade randomly; and market makers who set prices efficiently (in the semi-strong sense) conditional on information they have about the quantities traded by others. Trading is modelled as a sequence of many auctions, structured to give the model the flavor of a sequential equilibrium as described by Kreps and Wilson [4] .
At each auction trading takes place in two steps. In step one, the insider and the noise traders simultaneously choose the quantities they will trade (in effect, placing "market orders"). When making this choice, the insider's information consists of his private observation of the liquidation value of the asset, as well as past prices and past quantities traded by himself. He does not observe current or future prices, or current or future quantities traded by noise traders. The random quantity traded by noise traders is distributed independently from present or past quantities traded by the insider and independently from past quantities traded by noise traders. In step two, the market makers set a price, and trade the quantity which makes markets clear. When doing so, their information consists of observations of the current and past aggregate quantities traded by the insider and noise traders combined. We call these aggregate quantities the "order flow." (3) An investor who is buying or selling a large amount of stock, in the absence of special information, can expect to do so over a long period of time at a price not very different, on average, from the current market price.
(4) An investor can buy or sell a large block of stock immediately, but at a premium or discount that depends on the size of the block. The larger the block, the larger the premium or discount.
In other words, a liquid market is a continuous market, in the sense that almost any amount of stock can be bought or sold immediately, and an efficient market, in the sense that small amounts of stock can always be bought and sold very near the current market price, and in the sense that large amounts can be bought or sold over long periods of time at prices that, on average, are very near the current market price."
Roughly speaking, Black defines a liquid market as one which is almost infinitely tight, which is not infinitely deep, and which is resilient enough so that prices eventually tend to their underlying value.
Our continuous auction equilibrium has exactly the characteristics described by Black. Furthermore, these aspects of market liquidity acquire a new prominence in our model because the insider, who does not trade as a perfect competitor, must make rational conjectures about tightness, depth, and resiliency in choosing his optimal quantity to trade. Moreover, depth and resiliency are themselves endogenous consequences of the presence of the insider and noise traders in the market. Market depth is proportional to the amount of noise trading and inversely proportional to the amount of private information (in the sense of an error variance) which has not yet been incorporated into prices. This makes our model a rigorous version of the intuitive story told by Bagehot [1] . Furthermore, our emphasis on the dynamic optimizing behavior of the insider distinguishes our model from the one of Glosten and Milgrom [3] .
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, a single auction equilibrium is discussed in order to motivate the dynamic models which follow. In Section 3, a sequential auction equilibrium is defined, an existence and uniqueness result is proved, and properties of the equilibrium are derived. In Section 4, a continuous auction equilibrium is discussed heuristically, and in Section 5, it is shown that the continuous auction equilibrium is the limit of the sequential auction equilibrium as the time interval between auctions goes to zero. Section 6 makes some concluding comments.
A SINGLE AUCTION EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we motivate our equilibrium concept by discussing a simple model of one-shot trading.
Structure and Notation. The ex post liquidation value of the risky asset, denoted v, is normally distributed with mean po and variance LO. The quantity traded by noise traders, denoted u, is normally distributed with mean zero and variance o-2. The random variables v and u7 are independently distributed. The quantity traded by the insider is denoted x and the price is denoted p.
Trading is structured in two steps as follows: In step one, the exogenous values of v and iu are realized and the insider chooses the quantity he trades i. When doing so, he observes v-but not u. To accommodate mixed strategies, the insider's trading strategy, denoted X, assigns to outcomes of v probability distributions defined over quantities traded. Since, however, mixed strategies are not optimal in what follows, the more intuitive interpretation of X as a measurable function such that x = X(v) is justified. In step two, the market makers determine the price p at which they trade the quantity necessary to clear the market. When doing so they observe x? + i but not x or u7 (or v) separately. While their pricing rule, denoted P, can be defined to accommodate randomization, an intuitive interpretation of P as a measurable real function such that = P(i + ui) is also justified.
The profits of the informed trader, denoted ir, are given by ir = (v -p)x. To emphasize the dependence of 7r and p on X and P, we write 7r = I-r(X, P), p= p(X, P).
Definition of Equilibrium. An equilibrium is defined as a pair X, P such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) Profit Maximization: For any alternate trading strategy X' and for any v, This model is not quite a game theoretic one because the market makers do not explicitly maximize any particular objective. We could, however, replace the market efficiency condition in step two with an explicit Bertrand auction between at least two risk neutral bidders, each of whom observes the "order flow" i + uand nothing else. The result of this explicit auction procedure would be our market efficiency condition, in which profits of market makers are driven to zero. Modelling how market makers can earn the positive frictional profits necessary to attract them into the business of market making is an interesting topic which takes us away from our main objective of studying how price formation is influenced by the optimizing behavior of an insider in a somewhat idealized setting. Kyle [5] , however, discusses a model of imperfect competition among market makers, in which many insiders with different information participate.
The insider exploits his monopoly power by taking into account the effect the quantity he chooses to trade in step one is expected to have on the price established in step two. In doing so, he takes the rule market makers use to set prices in step two as given. He is not allowed to influence this rule by committing to a particular strategy in step one: The quantity he trades is required to be optimal, given his information set at the time it is chosen. This requirement seems to be reasonable given anonymous trading and the strong incentives informed traders have to cheat given any other strategy they commit to. The insider is not allowed to condition the quantity he trades on price. A model in which insiders choose demand functions ("limit orders") instead of quantities ("market orders") is considered in Kyle [6] . As shown below, many of these properties generalize to the sequential auction model in an appropriate way.
A SEQUENTIAL AUCTION EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we generalize the model of one-shot trading by examining a model in which a number of auctions, or rounds of trading, take place sequentially. The resulting dynamic model is structured so that equilibrium prices at each auction reflect the information contained in the past and current order flow and so that the insider maximizes his expected profits, taking into account his effect on prices in both the current auction and in future auctions.
Structure and Notation. Trading takes place over one trading day, which begins at time t = 0 and ends at time t = 1. There are N auctions, with tn denoting the time at which the nth auction takes place. We assume The market efficiency condition implies that trading prices follow a martingale whose pattern of volatility over time reflects the rate at which information is incorporated into prices. In a linear equilibrium, price increments are normally and independently distributed with zero means; thus, the distribution function for the pricing process is characterized by a sequence of variance parameters measuring the volatility of price fluctuations from auction to auction.
The profit maximization condition gives our equilibrium the flavor of a sequential equilibrium (as discussed by Kreps and Wilson [4] ). The quantity in chosen at the nth auction maximizes expected profits over the remaining rounds of trading given the information available to the insider when he chooses it. There is no commitment to strategies. This means that the insider cannot influence the pricing rule by committing to a trading rule before prices are established. Conversely, while the market makers impute a trading strategy to the insider, they do not observe it; they only observe the order flow. Note, however, that the profit maximization condition implies that for all trading strategies X', (3.10) E{ rn(X, P)} I E{fr (X', P)}.
Characterization of Equilibrium. In the rest of this section, we prove existence of a unique linear equilibrium, show that it is a recursive linear equilibrium, and characterize it as the solution to a difference equation system subject to boundary conditions. We suspect, but have not been able to prove, that equilibria with nonlinear Xn and Pn do not exist. The parameters ,83n(n = 1, . . ., N), which characterize the insider's trading strategy Xn, measure the intensity with which the insider trades on the basis of his private observation, and the parameters Akn(n = 1, .. ., N) , which characterize the recursive pricing rule, measure the depth of the market (with small An corresponding to a deep market). The parameters In (n = 1,.. ., N) , which give the error variance of prices after the nth auction, measure how much of the insider's private information is not yet incorporated into prices (as estimated by market makers). Note that 10 is just the variance of the initial prior price po. The parameters an-, and 8n-, define a quadratic profit function which gives the value of trading opportunities at auctions n, . . ., N.
Outline of Proof: The proof of the theorem is divided into three steps. In the first step, which is the most important one, a backward induction argument is used to obtain the insider's trading strategy and expected trading profits as a function of the pricing rule. Since the pricing rule is characterized by the market depth parameters An, the insider's problem is intuitively one of deciding how intensely to trade on the basis of his private information, given the pattern of market depth expected at current and future auctions. If market depth at future auctions is greater than market depth at the current auction, the insider has an incentive to "save" his private information by trading small quantities now and large quantities later. Conversely, if market depth declines in future auctions, the insider has an incentive to trade intensely at the current auction, where profits are greater.
Intuitively, the second order condition (3.20) rules out a situation in which the insider can make unbounded profits by first destabilizing prices with unprofitable trades made at the nth auction, then recouping the losses and much more with profitable trades made at future auctions. When An is large, it does not cost much to destabilize prices at the nth auction (because trading small quantities is sufficient), but when a,n is large, the value of future trading opportunities to the insider from moving the price far away from its liquidation value is large. The second order condition accordingly rules out unbounded destabilization schemes by placing an upper bound on An which decreases in an.
The backward induction argument in step one of the proof simultaneously shows that the insider's profit function is quadratic and that the linear equilibrium is recursive. In addition, it shows explicitly how the parameter an, which measures the value of private information at future auctions n + 1, . . ., N as a function of market depth at those auctions, combines with the current market depth parameter An to generate via backward induction values of 3,n and an-l.
In step two of the proof, the market efficiency condition is used to derive An and En from /3n and En-1 The idea here is that, given the level of noise trading (au Atn,), the depth of the market at a particular auction (An) depends negatively upon how much private information the insider has ( En-1) and how intensely the insider trades upon the basis of his private information (/3n), and this also determines how much of the insider's remaining private information is revealed at the particular auction and how much still remains private (hEn). This step of the proof makes precise Bagehot's idea that market makers respond to insider trading by reducing the liquidity of the market.
In step three of the proof, it is shown that the relationships derived in the first two steps generate a difference equation system which characterizes the unique linear equilibrium.
PROOF: We now give the details of the three steps of the proof.
Step 1. To prove by backward induction that the informed trader's expected profits are of the quadratic form specified in (3.14), we begin with the boundary condition aN = 8N = 0, which states that no profits on new positions are made after trade is completed. Now make the inductive hypothesis that for constants a^, and 8n, we have These are equivalent to (3.18) and (3.19).
Step 3. In steps one and two above, it is shown that given 10, equations 
A CONTINUOUS AUCTION EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we discuss unrigorously a model in which trading takes place continuously rather than at discrete intervals. Our main results are that the depth of the market is constant over time and the volatility of prices is constant. In Section 6, we show rigorously that the sequential auction equilibrium converges to the continuous auction equilibrium discussed here when auctions are held frequently.
Proceeding intuitively, let us define a continuous auction equilibrium exactly analogously to the sequential auction equilibrium discussed above. We take it for granted that a unique linear equilibrium with a structure analogous to the recursive equilibrium Theorem 2 exists. Write the analogues of (3.5), (3.11), and (3.12) as ( 
4.1) dlT(t) = [v -p(t) -dp(t)] dx(t) = [v -p(t)] dx(t), (4.2) dx(t) =f3 (t)[ v -p(t)] dt, (4.3) dp(t) = A(t)[dx(t) + du(t)].
Note that in this notation, we suppress tildes over random variables. Here we assume that the trading strategy dx and the pricing rule dp are characterized by the functions f(.) and A (h), respectively; we will not worry about trading strategies which have a more complicated structure. Readers unwilling to assume that a linear equilibrium has the simple structure of (4.1)-(4.3) are invited to interpret the following discussion as referring to a modified equilibrium concept in which ir, x, and p are constrained to have the simple linear form which we give them here. Because the dp dx term in (4.1) is of order dt312, whether trades are priced at the beginning or the end of the instant in which they occur has an inconsequential effect on the profits of the insider, given that he buys and sells smoothly. If trades were priced at the beginning of the instant in which they occurred, however, the insider would not want to trade smoothly: Instead, he would want to trade unbounded quantities at the prices quoted by market makers in advance, since his quantity traded would have no effect on the immediate execution price. Thus, we make the assumption that trades are priced at the end of the instant in which they occur, which is consistent with the sequential auction equilibrium discussed above. The assumption as to whether pricing occurs at the beginning or the end of the instant in which trades occur does affect the profits of the market makers and the noice traders because we have du dp = -Ako dt, i.e., du dp is of order dt and not of higher order like the corresponding term for the insider. "End-of-instant pricing" makes the market efficiency condition a zero profit condition for market makers by requiring that noise traders bear the losses incurred by virtue of the fact that they drive prices against themselves as they trade.
In a continuous auction equilibrium, the profit maximization condition states that given a pricing rule, the trading rule dx maximizes expected profits given by ( 
4.4) E{fr(t)I(p(s))[0,t]o, v}= E{ d7r(s) (p(s)),[o,t], v}
The market efficiency condition states that the pricing rule satisfies (4.
5) E{v I (dx + du)S,[O,]} = p(t).

Given arbitrary /3( ) and A(-), define L;*(t) and I(t) by (4.6) .Y*(t) = E{[v -p(t)]2}, (4.7) . (t) = var {vIl (dx + du)SEro,t]}.
Clearly, the market efficiency condition implies I*(t) = 2(t).
Assuming that the equilibrium has the linear form given in (3.2) and (3.3), we obtain the following theorem: 
A-1(t) d (-I (t)). t=O t=O
In this equation, the control /(t) has been eliminated from the optimization problem and only the state 2 *(t) remains. While . *(t) is defined for all functions of bounded variation, it is clear that all such functions attainable (even in a limiting sense) with controls 13(t) must satisfy 2*(t) O0. Thus, the insider's problem is equivalent to choosing an (otherwise attainable) V*(t) which satisfies this nonnegativity constraint. We now show using (4.19) that only a constant function A(t) is consistent with equilibrium. First, observe that we must have I (1) = 0 if the right-hand-side of (4.19) is to be maximized; in other words, the price p(t) must be driven by the insider to its underlying value v by the end of trading. Next, observe that if A (t) ever decreases (i.e., if market depth ever increases), then unbounded profits can be generated by letting I(t) increase a large amount before the increase in A(t) and then letting it decrease the same amount after the decrease. Since unbounded profits are inconsistent with equilibrium, we conclude that A (t) must be monotonically nondecreasing in any equilibrium.
Intuitively, the requirement that A (t) is nondecreasing eliminates profitable destabilization schemes and thus generalizes the second order condition (3.20) of the discrete model. With continuous trading, an insider who destabilizes prices by acquiring a large position in many small parcels over a short time period acts much like a perfectly discriminating monopsonist who moves up along a given supply curve. Since the supply curve is linear, the average price paid is approximately the mean of the highest and lowest prices paid on the small parcels. If the supply curve subsequently flattens (i.e., market depth increases), the insider can liquidate his position at a more favorable average price and thus generate unbounded profits by acquiring a large enough position in the first place.
It is also clear from inspecting (4.19) that in order to maximize profits, we must have *(t)=O at a point where A(t) is minimized. If A(t) were ever to increase, we would therefore have A (t*) = 0 for some t* satisfying t* <0. From the market efficiency condition, this would imply that all information would be incorporated into prices before the end of trading and thus that prices would cease to fiuctuate; but the only way for this to happen is to have A (t) =0 for t* < t < 1 and this is inconsistent with A (t) never decreasing. We conclude that A (t) never increases either. We have thus proved that A (t) must be a constant in equilibrium. A(t) is constant, any function I*(t) satisfying =*() =0 satisfies the profit maximization condition as long as it is attainable with some function /3(t). To calculate the values of A, /3(t), and I(t) consistent with equilibrium, we therefore turn to the market efficiency condition. Observe that (if /3(t) is finite) the instantaneous variance of dp is A2o-2 dt, i.e., the volatility of prices is completely dominated by noise trading. In order to have I (1) =0 and market efficiency, the integral of volatilities must add up to the prior variance I0. This gives us A2o-2 = I0 from which (4.10) and (4.11) are immediate implications. To determine the values of /3(t) consistent with market efficiency, observe that /3(t) must be such that A is the correct regression coefficient in the equation ( 
From (4.19), it is clear that if
4.18) E{v-p(t)j/3(t)[v-p(t)] dt+du(t)}= A[/3(v-p(t)) dt+du(t)].
The appropriate Kalman filtering formula for the regression coefficient is A= p(t)/l (t), from which (4.10) is an immediate consequence. We leave (4.11) and (4.12) for the reader to derive. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Properties of the Continuous Auction Equilibrium. The fact that 27'( t) is a constant (or, equivalently, that A (t) is a constant) in a continuous auction equilibrium implies that trading prices have constant volatility over time and therefore that information is gradually incorporated into prices at a constant rate. From the fact that I (1) = 0, we infer that all of the insider's private information is incorporated into prices by the end of trading, i.e. p(t) converges to v (in mean square) at t -* 1. Because of normality and the martingale properties inherent in the market efficiency condition, the price actually follows a Brownian motion process with instantaneous variance I0. Of course, the insider knows that the price path will eventually converge to the liquidation value v, but to market makers, who do not observe v explicitly, price fluctuations appear to have no drift.
Note that since the volatility of prices is determined by noise traders and not by the insider, there is a sense in which the "trading volume" of the insider is small. Despite his small trading volume, however, the insider ultimately determines what price is established at the end of trading. He does this because his trades, unlike the trades of noise traders, are positively correlated from period to period.
The expected (ex ante) profits of the insider, which equal the expected losses of noise traders, can be shown to equal z 112a". This is exactly double the profits the insider expects in the single auction equilibrium.
Market Liquidity. It is interesting to compare the liquidity properties of the continuous auction equilibrium with the corresponding properties of a sequential auction equilibrium. It was pointed out above that "market liquidity" refers to several different elements of transactions costs, including "tightness," "depth," and "resiliency."
"Tightness" refers to the cost of turning over a position in a short period of time. In the continuous auction equilibrium, the market is infinitely tight, in the sense that it is costless to turn over a position very quickly. This occurs because a trader acts like a perfectly discriminating monopsonist, who moves along a given "expected residual supply curve." In a sequential auction equilibrium, however, the monopolist is not able to trade at every price along the supply curve because auctions are not held closely enough together. As a result, the market is not infinitely tight, and the cost of turning over a position is an increasing function of how quickly it must be done.
"Depth" refers to the ability of the market to absorb quantities without having a large effect on price. It is measured by the reciprocal of the liquidity parameter A (t). In the continuous auction equilibrium, the depth of the market is constant. In the proof of Theorem 3, we showed that this is the case because neither increasing nor decreasing depth is consistent with behavior by the informed trader which is "stable" enough to sustain an equilibrium. If depth ever increases, the insider wants to destabilize prices (before the increase in depth) to generate unbounded profits. If depth ever decreases, the insider wants to incorporate all of his private information into the price immediately. This constancy of market depth also explains why the volatility of prices is constant in a continuous auction equilibrium. In a sequential auction equilibrium, depth is not constant over time.
Market "resiliency" refers to the speed with which prices tend to converge towards the underlying liquidation value of the commodity. Resiliency also measures the rate at which prices bounce back from an uninformative shock. In both the continuous and sequential auction equilibria, the resiliency of prices is determined by the trading of the insider. Noise trading causes the price to wander aimlessly, with no tendency to return to an underlying value. Note that in the continuous auction equilibrium, the fact that /8(t) increase in t means that the resiliency of the market increases in t. Since p (t) In doing so, it illustrates that constant volatility of prices need not require that the information upon which trades are based be produced in a smooth manner. Finally, the model demonstrates how the liquidity characteristics of an "efficient," "frictionless" market can be derived from underlying information asymmetries in a dynamic trading environment which captures some relevant features of trading in organized exchanges.
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